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“I love America more than any other country in this world 
and exactly for this reason I insist on the right to criticize 
her perpetually.” — James Baldwin 
Introduction 
Nebraska, like all states, is host to a number of consistently low-per-
forming schools. This is by definition, as under the influence of No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) and its more recent replacement (the Every 
Student Succeeds Act, or ESSA), schools are compared with each other 
using the same test score metrics and some fare worse than others. 
In turn, Nebraska, like a lot of states, recently determined that state-
led interventions were needed to help these consistent low-perform-
ers “turn around.” This paper, derived from a dissertation (Phillips 
2017) that examined much of that effort (from the Nebraska legisla-
ture, to the state board of education, to the state department of ed-
ucation, and then ultimately out to four targeted schools), examines 
one curious, but sadly not unique, dimension of Nebraska’s effort: De-
spite state intervention being rationalized under a logic of there being 
extant expertise at the state level (as well as a supposed dearth in the 
intervention schools), the state rather quickly turned not to its state 
department of education (SDE) but to a North Carolina-based consul-
tant to lead the interventions. 
Making schools equitable has long been a preoccupation of poli-
cymakers, practitioners, and anthropologists of education, but it re-
mains the case that that intent too often falls short in practice (Au 
2009; Lashaw 2010; Peck and Reitzug 2014; Trujillo and Renée 2013). 
So, informed by the very large (and career-spanning) question of “why 
do certain kids struggle at school?” or phrased inversely, “why do cer-
tain schools struggle with certain kids?” we ask here an anthropology 
of policy implementation question (Hamann and Rosen 2011): Where 
is the expertise that could enduringly help a struggling school pur-
ported to be? Or, as an overlapping question, whose expertise counts 
when the task is to help four very different (albeit similarly low-scor-
ing) schools? In posing these questions, we note that decisions made 
away from schools (in district offices, state offices, and legislative 
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chambers) can be substantively consequential for what happens at 
schools, so asking about why certain schools struggle with certain kids 
(and struggle broadly if there   are a lot of “such kids”), we assert that 
schools are not the only settings where our questions should be pur-
sued. Furthermore, if we assume that expertise is built through inter-
vention and acknowledge that Nebraska’s rationale for targeting spe-
cific schools from a larger universe of identified schools was to build 
expertise that would eventually help these other identified schools, we 
can pose one more question: How was a system that spans from state 
legislature to struggling classrooms supposed to learn? If it learned, 
how would it keep/store the expertise it developed? 
We acknowledge that these are big questions, but we insist that 
they are important questions, because they help us transcend a chal-
lenge identified by then-AEQ Editor Katie Anderson-Levitt (1997, 316) 
more than twenty years ago in her introduction to a special issue (or-
ganized by Margaret Gibson) concerned with schooling and equal-
ity. She explained, “For all that ‘failure’ is artificially constructed by 
schools, it is constructed on the backs of some students more than oth-
ers. We would have to be blind not to notice that, in spite of individu-
als’ strategies of resistance and thousands of success stories, we can 
predict with some regularity which racial and ethnic categories en-
compass disproportionate numbers of students failed by the system.” 
Part of the work of anthropology of education is to locate where the 
challenges to educational success emerge (including well away from 
the affected students) or, framed more particularly, why do some in-
terventions, that may well be characterizable as substantial and well-
meaning, nonetheless not interrupt the dynamics of certain schools’ 
struggles for long? 
The case described here allows us to critically examine how edu-
cation policy investments in external consultants are shaping, “who 
currently gets to define which forms of knowledge will count as use-
ful for whom” (Moss 2013, 238). It concurrently allows us to inves-
tigate what happens to the knowledge, or learning, that comes from 
the intervention. As we will illustrate, in this case public dollars were 
invested to essentially develop, then rent, external, private knowl-
edge rather than to build local and state public capacity. This all said, 
our study is not intended as a critique of “the lady from North Car-
olina” per se—she was an experienced educator, although with little 
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Nebraska experience. Rather, in keeping with the James Baldwin epi-
gram that opens this paper, our intent is to critique the consultocracy 
that she exemplifies. 
This case raises questions about policy prescriptions that (a) pre-
sume or at least permit that schools with diverse contexts and histo-
ries require the same type of intervention, (b) assume the primary 
problem in “low-performing schools” is that local administrators and 
faculty lack information a consultant possesses, and (c) position a con-
sultant to answer to funders (in this case the state board of education 
[SBOE] and SDE) thereby functioning according to a “political” policy 
clock (Noble and Smith 2000), rather than in response to the “objects 
of the political technology at work” (Foucault 1977, 200)—that is, to 
the students, teachers, and other constituents of the identified schools. 
The case also considers the consequences of imagining or failing to 
imagine a state department of education as a learning organization 
(Hamann and Lane 2004; Lusi 1997; Whitford and Jones 2000). Find-
ings raise questions about building SDE capacity to support struggling 
schools when hiring outside expertise and problematize the power 
constructs at play when an external consultant inevitably marches to 
the cadence of policymakers’ political clock rather than the tempo of 
change at the building level. 
Although the larger case study that this was drawn from was mul-
tifaceted, as is appropriate for a dissertation (Phillips 2017), the po-
lemic of this piece is narrower—to describe the problem diagnoses 
that led to Nebraska’s decision to intervene in several low-performing 
schools, to describe the consultocracy (Gunter et al. 2015) that ulti-
mately  became the “efficient” way to support schools and to describe 
a not-pursued alternative to the consultocracy in which the expertise 
for helping low-performing schools would come from SDE personnel 
and remain part of Nebraska’s professional public infrastructure sup-
porting other schools. 
On April 10 the Nebraska State Legislature (a.k.a., the “Unicam-
eral”) passed Legislative Bill 438 (LB 438), which provided a statu-
tory outline for a new school accountability system. All public schools 
and districts were to be classified into performance levels accord-
ing to a complex calculation that included student achievement and 
growth on statewide assessments and school graduation rates. Ac-
cording to LB 438, which became codified in statute Neb. Rev. Stat. 
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§§ 79-760.06-.07, the SBOE was authorized to help the SDE intervene 
in up to three “priority schools” identified among schools in the low-
est performance classification. SDE intervention teams were then ex-
pected to work in collaboration with the local school board and the 
administration and staff of each priority school to create a progress 
plan for improvement. As in many other state accountability systems, 
the improvement in Nebraska’s priority schools was to be measured 
by student performance on statewide assessment (Au 2013; Koyama 
2013). 
Between April 2014 and December 2015, the Nebraska Department 
of Education (NDE) at the direction of the SBOE developed this ac-
countability system (which came to be known as AQuESTT) and pro-
cesses for identifying and concurrently intervening in up to three 
priority schools. When announcing the first three identified prior-
ity schools in December 2015, Commissioner of Education Matthew 
Blomstedt explained that he hoped intervention work would provide 
knowledge as to how the system of education in Nebraska might be 
able to support all struggling schools to improve achievement out-
comes. Among the 1130 schools in the state, under the new system, 87 
schools had been classified as “Needing Improvement.” These schools, 
according to Blomstedt, fell into four primary themes: Native Amer-
ican communities, demographically transitioning communities (read 
increasingly Latinx communities), small communities with declining 
population (read “poor white”), and urban school communities (read 
largely African American; Nebraska State Board of Education 2015). 
He explained that in recommending initial priority schools he had se-
lected a school representative of three of the four themes. His first 
three priority schools were Loup County Elementary in Taylor, Ne-
braska (in a primarily white, rural community with declining enroll-
ment), Druid Hill Elementary (serving primarily African American stu-
dents) in Omaha, and Santee Middle School (serving Native American 
students) on the Santee Sioux Reservation. Crucially, the rationale for 
picking an example of each type of struggling school was that there 
was no “one size fits all” formula for improvement. Different strug-
gling schools would need different interventions. 
Although this was not the first time a state had intervened into 
the historically local governance prerogative of school system man-
agement—New Jersey (Erlichson 2005), Kentucky and Vermont (Lusi 
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1997), and Texas (Valenzuela 2005) are among the older examples—
this was the first time Nebraska had acted in such a fashion. At this 
stage, turning to a consultant had not been broached, but that would 
soon change. 
Education Policy and Implementation 
There is a long history of education reform efforts intended to im-
prove schooling in the United States (Tyack and Cuban 1995). As per-
ceived societal needs shift, what is demanded from the education sys-
tem also shifts and, thus, the landscape of education policy is ever 
changing (Apple 2006; Berliner and Biddle 1995; Labaree 2010). Ed-
ucation reforms are often externally mandated (many times coming 
from legislative action as  happened in this case) and are intended to 
have widespread and deep implementation at the local level, although 
Coburn (2003) notes how hard it is to actually get reforms to change 
classroom practice. Like other critical policy studies (e.g., Au 2013; 
Koyama and Kania 2016), this article seeks to understand the power 
constructs that exist when an education reform intended to improve 
schools moves across tiers from conceptualization to implementation 
at the local level. 
One key and pertinent national school-reform-precipitating event 
was the National Commission on Excellence in Education’s publica-
tion in 1983 of A Nation at Risk, which “sounded alarms about Ameri-
ca’s dwindling competitiveness…[and] the disparities in achievement 
among different racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups and classes be-
came cause for public concern” (Knowles 2003, 39). The report, “with 
its incendiary language… soon became a touchstone in the history of 
American education” (Gordon and Graham 2003, 1). It largely blamed 
educators for the “rising tide of mediocrity” and “unilateral educational 
disarmament” of the nation’s public schools and diagnosed the sys-
tem’s main challenge as one of inadequate expectations. So it encour-
aged policymakers to focus on raising standards in a set of policies var-
iously called the Excellence Movement and the Standards Movement, 
a movement that called for more rigorous high school graduation re-
quirements, more student assessments, and increased teacher licen-
sure requirements (Proefriedt 2008; Ravitch 2010; Vinovskis 2003). 
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Buoyed also by the National Governor Association’s first-ever Ed-
ucation Summit in 1990, in the 1990s states moved beyond their pre-
vious monitoring and funding roles, and constructed policies around 
the daily work of schools related to more rigorous curriculum stan-
dards, higher stakes assessments, and increased educator effective-
ness (Schwartz 2003; Sleeter 2007). As part of a larger neoliberal logic 
that marked much of the policy produced by the Reagan, H.W. Bush, 
Clinton, and W. Bush administrations, bipartisan policy remedies for 
school improvement reflected market-based solutions, as both federal 
and state legislative bodies developed policy around curricular stan-
dards, assessments, and educator evaluation tied to student perfor-
mance (Apple 2006; Cuban 2003). With that as the backdrop, federal 
legislators debated a more prominent federal role with the drafting in 
2001 of a bill to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA). Their product, NCLB, was the major extant K–12 federal 
education policy until near the end of Barack Obama’s second term, 
when the ESSA formally supplanted it. 
Before NCLB, lawmakers had been hesitant to centralize educa-
tional reform or accountability, acknowledging that the diversity of 
communities and schools, with their unique needs and governance 
structures, presented a challenge to prescribing educational reform 
that could adequately meet the needs of such varied contexts (Cohen 
1995; Gordon and Graham 2003; Labaree 2010). Nonetheless, with an 
impatience to help struggling schools and an exchange of promised 
funding increases with the addition of more structure, NCLB was the 
high-water mark for bipartisanship under President George W. Bush. 
Introducing ideas and turns of phrase like “adequate yearly progress” 
and mandating standardized tests at multiple grade levels, NCLB dras-
tically changed public education in the United States (Au 2013; Vinovs-
kis 2003; Weiner 2007). 
One consequence of NCLB included emphasizing the “deficiencies 
of schools and students while deemphasizing collaborative and pro-
active interventions at the school level” (Hall and Parker 2007, 132). 
Schools were labeled as “failing” for not meeting performance bench-
marks in the law as measured by student performance on high-stakes 
state assessments. “Failing” schools then crafted and enacted plans 
for improvement. In the case of one school engaged in a “turnaround,” 
Koyama described the strategy to improve  student test scores as 
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teaching a narrowed curriculum aligned to what would be tested. 
She noted, “[This] did not take into account the diverse demograph-
ics of the students” (2015, 552). 
Trujillo and Renée (2013) criticized the over reliance on standard-
ized assessment scores in school turnaround efforts and advocated 
for more community engagement in the development and implemen-
tation of such efforts. Where schools were once presumed to be ac-
countable to their local community and governing board, NCLB made 
schools accountable to state and federal standards. Under NCLB, states 
implemented school improvement grants (SIGs) tied to the law and 
developed their own state accountability systems and interventions. 
Efforts to “improve” schools at the local level were tied to “evidence-
based” models and largely ignored local school context or agency in 
the design of school improvement plans. 
Under a logic of “local control,” Nebraska resisted NCLB’s changes 
longer than most states (Gallagher 2007), but eventually it too decided 
to create a statewide assessment to compare schools in relationship 
to performance metrics. This is the larger context that led to the state 
legislation (LB 438) that resulted in the plan, called AQuESTT (short 
for Accountability for a Quality Education System, Today and Tomor-
row), that led to the consulting arrangement further scrutinized here. 
The “Consultocracy” 
In the quest to reform or “turn around” struggling schools, states and 
districts have looked outside of their boundaries for programs and 
people to guide them in rapid improvement (VanGronigen and Mey-
ers 2019). As Sturges (2015, 129) asserts, these “neoliberal policies 
have opened the door to a steady stream of contract providers who 
assist struggling schools while producing market-ready reforms.” Ball 
(2009), (2012) and Ledger and Vidovitch (2018) describe the phenom-
enon as “outsourcing” and, in turn, describe the outsourcing of poli-
cymaking and implementation and curriculum and assessment. 
Gunter et al. (2015, 518) describe the increasing role of private con-
sultants or consultancy groups and the power they have been given by 
government organizations as an emerging “consultocracy.” Mahony et 
al. (2004) have termed this the growth of “edu-business,” and as Van-
Gronigen and Meyers (2019) point out in their survey of SDE capacity 
to “turn around schools” under ESSA plans, eight states rely entirely 
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on external consultants to lead improvement efforts and many more 
create hybrid options for local schools to contract with such consul-
tants to support implementation of improvement plans. 
To make sense of the consultocracy, we draw upon Michael Apple’s 
(2004) description of neoliberal ideology in education as a framework 
for school reform that privileges the private sphere and borrows from 
corporate business models that eschew conceptions of education as a 
public good that advances democratic aims. Consistent with a neolib-
eral logic, the market’s competitiveness is supposed to create innova-
tion and expertise, and there is no need per se to build or sustain ex-
pertise among those employed by public bureaucracies. So there has 
been a shift of expertise to consultants, that is, “new knowledge ac-
tors” (Mills 2015, 209) or “corporatized actors” (Courtney 2015, 214). 
As Datnow et al. (2005) found in their study of external school re-
form models, there is little evidence to support the rationale that what 
works to improve one school can be brought, cookie-cutter fashion, to 
improve another school. Yet, in states like Nebraska, the political pres-
sure for system accountability and rapid reform drives policymakers 
(legislators, state and local board members) toward systemic reforms 
that often embed “one size fits all” strategies even as some rhetoric may 
acknowledge local differences.  Indeed the existence of that rhetoric 
may obfuscate how the state intervention strategy is so homogeneous. 
State politics explain Nebraska’s decision to act (Phillips 2019) in 
2014 and, in turn, make relevant Noble and Smith’s (2000) clocks met-
aphor that was derived from their study of school reform implementa-
tion by Delaware and Arizona’s SDEs. Noble and Smith (2000, 181) as-
serted that the educational reform “doesn’t run at the same speed for 
everyone,” identifying three types of clocks in the implementation—a 
political clock, a professional clock, and a teacher clock—adding, “the 
source of reform determines the speed of the clock, and the history of 
varied success of specific policies and initiatives is readily explained 
in this way.” Because the reform in this case was initiated by the state 
legislature, which then charged the SBOE to craft a plan that the SDE 
would implement, the political clock is the dominant frame. We will 
reference these contrasting clocks (and their different speeds) as we 
analyze what unfolded in Nebraska’s priority school intervention and 
the positioning of an external consultant financially incentivized to 
answer to the SBOE rather than to attend to practitioners across con-
trasting local contexts. 
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Methodology 
In ethnography that “studies up” (i.e., considers the powerful), the 
questions asked should guide the methodology. The research strategy 
employed should be “eclectic in its methods [and] broad in its vision 
of what it takes to understand [humans]” (Nader 1972, 293). In ac-
knowledgment of the very different situatedness of legislative, SBOE, 
SDE, district, school, and consultant actors in this case, we have not 
called the larger study that this was drawn from an ethnography, in-
stead preferring ethnographically informed comparative case study 
(Bartlett and Vavrus 2016) because of its attention to the vertical and 
transversal axis of examining how policy is implemented across scales 
in a particular moment in policy history. 
We used an ethnographically informed approach, “borrowing from 
ethnographic techniques” (Wolcott 2008, 44), in order to access the 
complexities of the policy across tiers of implementation. The field-
work occurred over an extended period of time (2013–2016); it oppor-
tunistically incorporated an array of data collection methods in order 
to support our understandings of various organizational cultures of 
the space, emerging patterns, and insider (emic) and outsider (etic) 
perspectives (Atkinson 1990; Van Maanen 1988). Data include tran-
scripts from seventy-two legislative hearings and SBOE work sessions 
and meetings that included state senators, elected state board of ed-
ucation representatives, the commissioner of Education, and staff of 
the SDE. We collected more than 250 public artifacts or “material cul-
ture” (Hodder 2012) from state-policy documents as well as artifacts 
from local implementation in each of the first three priority schools. 
This data collection was substantially facilitated by Phillips’s role 
as a full-time SDE employee and designated liaison to one of the 
AQuESTT focal schools.1 That role also meant she spent more than 200 
hours engaged in fieldwork at the school, interacting with local school 
board members, school administrators, teachers, staff, and commu-
nity. As such, she interacted with educators at that school both in the 
presence of the lady from North Carolina and in her absence. Phillips 
1. Hamann has long studied education policy implementation by SDEs (among other actors) 
and has engaged in limited consulting for NDE. His broader familiarity with SDE-sup-
ported school reform efforts (e.g., Hamann and Lane 2004]), offered useful broader con-
text to Phillips’s insider perspective with NDE. 
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also met regularly with the other SDE liaisons to the target schools 
and can vouch that the expectations for liaisons (a new role, given 
that the priority schools were newly designated) were only vaguely 
enumerated, but liaisons were clearly subordinate to the consultant 
although designated to work with her, not for her.  
Toma (2000) described the benefit of proximity in qualitative re-
search. An insider has an understanding of a particular context or 
culture that is hard for an outsider to quickly gain. They are fluent in 
the jargon of the study setting and their presence is welcome and ex-
pected, rather than awkward. Toma acknowledges that insiders can 
be blind to noticing “what seems normal.” By coauthoring this piece 
and engaging with the literature we have tried to notice what an in-
sider could miss. Similarly, Toma acknowledges “insider accounts” 
can be seen as interested. He suggests the best way to mitigate such a 
concern is to be transparent to readers, to position you to determine 
if the account seems credible. Our analysis was an iterative process 
that included review, coding of themes, and analytic memos (Bowen 
2009; Owen 2014). We were able to triangulate data and to examine 
how themes interacted across discourse from transcripts, artifacts, 
and field notes. We also provided opportunities for member check-
ing (McQuillan 1998) in an effort to ensure triangulation and validity. 
As a final methodological note, although it is possible from the 
public record and newspaper accounts to identify the consultant we 
are describing here (so we would not be violating any presumption 
of confidentiality if we did so), we have chosen to reference her only 
as “the lady from North Carolina” and “the consultant.” We hope this 
directs attention away from her biography or personal story because 
our intent is to critique a role, not an individual. We did not formally 
interview her following the data collection for the broader study on 
AQuESTT’s implementation, although she is quoted directly in several 
of the textual artifacts we examine. We should add that in one of the 
newspaper articles where she is quoted, a state senator is also quoted 
complaining about the cost of her consulting and wondering whether 
it is “efficient” (Dejka 2019). 
Again noting the public record dimensions of most of this, we do 
refer to the commissioner and SBOE members usually by name. They 
were public figures doing public jobs. Within those roles it was im-
portant to situate the relationship of the SBOE to the work of the 
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commissioner, his deputies, and NDE. The members of the SBOE were 
elected officials and thus must be attentive to their populous in order 
to maintain their positions. The commissioner was hired by the board 
and, in a sense, serves at its pleasure. Deputy commissioners and em-
ployees of the SDE were hired with the approval of the commissioner. 
The Lady from North Carolina 
In December 2015, Commissioner Blomstedt announced his recom-
mendations for three AQuESTT priority schools selected for state in-
tervention based primarily on student performance on standardized 
statewide assessments, graduation rates, and the fact that each was 
an exemplar of a type of struggling school. SBOE members responded 
positively to his recommendations. The president of the SBOE high-
lighted the role of the intervention teams that the Commissioner pro-
posed which would provide guidance and input to “see that the con-
tinuous plan that’s in place…is going to have some positive results” 
(Nebraska State Board of Education 2015). 
Another board member, one whose district included the Loup 
County priority school, described the disposition an intervention team 
ought to have, “not there to punish, or to say ‘you’re doing it all wrong, 
or you put this on the shelf,’ but that we’re there to work with them 
and listen to them” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2015, empha-
sis added). She acknowledged that as the intervention team worked 
with each priority school and as each school implemented its prog-
ress plan, “[O]ther schools that are in the Needs Improvement cate-
gory are going to be watching how we treat and how we intervene…I 
just hope that we go in with the respect for what they are doing” (Ne-
braska State Board of Education 2015). 
The commissioner agreed and stated his intention was to attend to 
locality in the development of improvement plans. He anticipated that 
in studying the “types” of schools struggling according to AQuESTT’s 
performance metrics there might be patterns of action to support im-
provement at other schools and cast a vision that the SBOE could de-
velop larger “system of support” for all schools in the state. Whether 
this was conceptualized as “finding what worked and moving it cookie-
cutter fashion elsewhere” (which Datnow et al. [2005] have pointed 
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out does not work) was not clear yet. The original plan did seem to 
suggest that at least the different types of challenged schools should 
not be approached the same way. That acknowledgment, however, 
did not address whether it was appropriate to measure “success” the 
same way at all the schools. (It was later made clear that the metric 
for success would be rather narrow—improvement in students’ stan-
dardized test scores.) 
Looking For External Solutions 
Only a month later in January 2016, NDE Deputy Commissioner Frison 
announced to a small group of staff who had worked on the AQuESTT 
project team (Phillips included) that NDE would issue a contract to a 
consultant from North Carolina to complete reviews of priority schools 
to assess what needed to go into improvement plans according to each 
context. The lady from North Carolina (as she was referred to at sev-
eral sites) was a recently retired assistant superintendent of Instruc-
tional Design and Innovation from a 12,000-student North Carolina 
district that was two-thirds white, but also approximately 15% each 
African American and Hispanic. (Her record did not include prior 
work with reservation schools.) Through her hiring, Nebraska was 
following precedent set by other states, calling upon external exper-
tise and “market-ready reforms” to improve priority schools (Sturges 
2015; VanGronigen and Meyers 2019). Perhaps explaining why she was 
picked, before taking on the AQuESTT role the lady from North Caro-
lina had already consulted in Omaha at Druid Hill Elementary, one of 
the three priority schools. 
At the January meeting, Frison told members of the nascent inter-
vention teams that the consultant would join a small project team—
including the accountability coordinator, an NDE liaison to each pri-
ority school, representation from each school’s intermediate service 
agency (Nebraska has Educational Service Units that act as regional 
intermediaries between often quite small districts and NDE), and Fri-
son herself—on visits to the three schools. A month later this team 
made initial visits to all three schools with the stated purpose of es-
tablishing a positive working relationship that would support the de-
velopment and implementation of a progress plan tailored to each 
school. The lady from North Carolina played a central role in these 
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conversations, asking principals how often they were in classrooms 
observing instruction, what professional learning staff had been pro-
vided throughout the school year so far, and what the vision for the 
school would look like in the next couple of years. 
She returned to the state again in early March 2016 for a two-day 
trip to complete “diagnostic reviews,” again with the stated intention 
of studying the local context in order to develop progress plans for 
each of the three “types” of schools each priority school represented. 
Visits in each school included classroom observations, conversations 
with the administrative team, and a “glows and grows” process to 
gather input from a cross-section of teachers, community members, 
and students. On the surface, the lady from North Carolina’s approach 
aligned with Trujillo and Renée’s (2013) recommendations for  culti-
vating democratic school turnaround efforts (e.g., engaging authen-
tically with teachers, families and community in the design process 
and focusing on teaching and learning). 
Following those visits, the consultant compiled her findings into 
approximately twenty-page reports for each school, completing and 
delivering them before the end of the month. Despite the contrasting 
needs of the three priority schools, evident in the raw data included 
in the appendices of each report, her recommendations for prioritiz-
ing objectives for improvement plans were organized around identical 
needs and what she described as her “three levers of improvement”: 
Clear and Compelling Direction, School Culture, and Instructional Ca-
pacity (Nebraska Department of Education 2016, 2). 
The lady from North Carolina again visited Nebraska in May to 
outline for NDE staff the process for crafting priority school progress 
plans prior to the August SBOE meeting (when according to the leg-
islation all priority school plans were to be approved). She indicated 
which goals should be part of each school’s plan and how they ought 
to be aligned to her three levers of improvement. She instructed NDE’s 
accountability coordinator on strategies to facilitate work with the 
handful of staff in each school to ensure the determined goals were 
identified and drafted. The focus of the goals and strategies described 
below were the same across the three priority schools. 
The June 2016 SBOE monthly work session included an update on 
the work in the priority schools. The commissioner, after making a 
couple remarks about the need to support improvement in the priority 
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schools turned it over to the consultant and NDE’s accountability co-
ordinator. The lady from North Carolina began her presentation, out-
lining her levers of improvement. She explained that “Clear and com-
pelling direction… focuses on the vision of the school—the core values 
and not just having a sense of mission.” The sense of the school’s pur-
pose, she clarified, should be present across all stakeholders from the 
local board of education, to students and families, and to educators. 
“It’s really looking at overall direction of how the school prepares the 
students for the world of work, to pursue college education, or serve 
in the military” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016a). The sec-
ond area in her model examined staff and student culture, “to deter-
mine if the schools were places where students wanted to attend” 
(Nebraska State Board of Education 2016a). She looked at whether or 
not “the staff wanted to be there to teach the students and have that 
sense of urgency around educating students and meeting the needs of 
the children there” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016a). Addi-
tionally, she explained, an element of the culture was also related to 
whether the school, “is a place where parents want to send their stu-
dents to learn and feel safe in doing so” (Nebraska State Board of Ed-
ucation 2016a). The lady from North Carolina then described the third 
and final component of her review: instructional leadership capacity. 
Each of the schools would focus on: 
developing the talents of teachers…providing support to 
them with curriculum alignment to the Nebraska state stan-
dards, also their lesson planning processes [and] are they 
adding rigor to the curriculum and differentiating instruction 
for students who need it most on both ends of the spectrum…
[and] most importantly getting students ready for the next 
level of learning. (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016a) 
She then clarified that the information included in the review re-
port for each school would inform the progress planning and ensure 
goals are “attainable” and “specific” in order to “help them get out 
of priority status quickly” (Nebraska Department State Board of Ed-
ucation 2016a). The goal would be, she explained, “to learn from the 
processes that we create so that we can replicate those other places” 
(Nebraska State Board of Education  2016a). She did not comment 
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on the premise that these schools had different challenges and might 
thus need different support. She also did not comment on the prem-
ise that getting “out of priority status quickly” meant boosting stu-
dent achievement scores on statewide assessments, and thus, each 
school would have essentially the same plan focused narrowly on in-
struction in reading and math. 
Commissioner Blomstedt expressed his appreciation in seeing all 
the pieces coming together in the progress plan, stating that, “I think 
it’s a quite remarkable process…the fact of the matter is, we’re trying 
to build a model that helps these three schools” (Nebraska State Board 
of Education 2016a, emphasis added). The work would inform how 
the state should approach supporting improvement in Needs Improve-
ment schools by providing, “a road map for how schools generally get 
their improvement strategies done…It’s a unique time because we’re 
doing that work from a state level” (Nebraska State Board of Educa-
tion 2016a). No longer were there discussions about attending to the 
context, complexities, or assets in each school community or what it 
would mean to improve schools or systems according to broader in-
dicators of success. 
It is important to note here that, whereas the lady from North Car-
olina’s three levers encompassed indicators beyond those related to 
raising assessment scores (i.e., mission and vision, building culture) 
in the “road map” provided to each school, in their progress plans, her 
consulting support focused on building principal instructional lead-
ership capacity and ensuring standards-aligned instruction. Both of 
these were intended to boost statewide assessment scores in each 
building. The sincere (but simplistic) assumptions did not take into 
account the context and histories of each local school or acknowl-
edge that some intractable and long-term challenges (i.e., staff turn-
over, student mobility, poverty) do not have quick solutions that can 
be achieved through the work of a single external expert. 
The SBOE did not meet between June and August 2016. However, 
revisions of progress plans continued. Not surprisingly, each plan 
contained nearly identical goals and strategies that would be imple-
mented under the consultant’s direction one to two days a month. 
One priority school administrator commented on this in a meeting 
about his school’s progress plan. He questioned how plans for such 
different schools in such different community contexts had plans that 
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could look so similar. He wondered how one person might be an ex-
pert on how to help such different places. There was no response to 
this statement. 
Instead of relying on local knowledge or regional expertise (or fol-
lowing through on the initial intention to “respect what’s been done”), 
the pursued policy prescription determined that there were similar 
knowledge deficits at each of the struggling schools that could be cor-
rected through the knowledge of the same external consultant carry-
ing out the same actions in each school. In this way, AQuESTT’s im-
plementation was constructed on a neoliberal premise set forward by 
NCLB, “that schools alone are unable to close the achievement gaps 
across social class and racial fissures and that they are in need of out-
side, often businesslike, intervention” (Koyama 2011, 20). In turn, the 
knowledge of most worth (Moss 2013) was knowledge that could be 
rented for one to two days a month rather than the local knowledge 
embedded in the community and working in the school every day. This 
presumption that once knowledge or skill gaps were corrected by the 
external consultant, barriers to improvement would be dismantled 
and improvement sustained in each place, ignores larger questions 
about the ways education policy attends to or reinforces structures of 
power (Hall and McGinty 1997; Young 1999) and the sometimes com-
peting policy cadence of policymakers and practitioners in policy im-
plementation (Noble and Smith 2000).  
Influence of the Political Clock 
By the time the August SBOE meeting arrived the lady from North Car-
olina was ready with a progress plan draft for each of the three prior-
ity schools. When she and NDE’s accountability coordinator moved to 
sit at the table before the board, the commissioner told board mem-
bers that it was, “a monumental point in time for us to look at prior-
ity schools [and how] our role as an agency is changing” (Nebraska 
State Board of Education 2016b). Just as she had in June, the lady from 
North Carolina described the “levers” of her process. She described 
how the voices of a range of stakeholder groups was involved over 
“many hours, many, many hours creating the plans that they have sub-
mitted for your approval” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b). 
She asserted that each of the three school’s plans were unique, “based 
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on the needs that they have within their community and within their 
school district,” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b). However, 
as she outlined key components of each school’s progress plan reflect-
ing her three levers of school improvement, the similarities (beyond 
the structure) were evident. 
As Phillips later summarized in an analytic memo 
Throughout this presentation, I sat in the public gallery in the 
state board room directly behind the [Santee Middle School 
administrative team]. I wondered how the school represen-
tatives felt as they listened to the discussion of their schools, 
their staff members, and their students. I wondered, because 
in the presentation to the SBOE, representatives from San-
tee were never asked what they thought. When the lady from 
North Carolina described “the many, many hours” she had 
spent on developing the progress plans I wondered whether 
SBOE members would notice that, according to the contracts 
they had approved in previous months, she had spent a total 
of a day and a half in each building. Apparently, 30 hours, or 
10 per school, was “many, many.” (Nebraska State Board of 
Education 2016b) 
At the meeting Commissioner Blomstedt and Deputy Commissioner 
Frison expressed appreciation for the consultant and the NDE staff’s 
work on coordinating progress plans. “We have come,” Frison said, 
“so very far” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b). In their dis-
cussions of the plan, board member Glen Flint asked about exit crite-
ria and Frison responded that, “I don’t think there is exit criteria in 
the plan, and I would almost emphasize the fact that the plan is so to 
speak, fluid” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b). 
Board member Patrick McPherson was not satisfied with this re-
sponse, asking, “Wouldn’t it make sense though, to have some kind of 
tangible exit criteria goals for these schools so that, you know…they 
know what they’ve got to achieve in order to get off the list?” (Ne-
braska State Board of Education 2016b). Commissioner Blomstedt re-
minded the board that each school is, “a priority school until this body 
says that they’re not” (Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b). The 
progress plans, Blomstedt said, would last for one year and in that 
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time, “it gives us a chance to kind of dissect that, and by next year…
we make judgment about where they’re at in those plans” (Nebraska 
State Board of Education 2016b). This discussion highlighted the em-
phasis SBOE members and SDE leadership placed on time. Statutory 
language stated that a priority school must demonstrate sufficient im-
provement to be removed from priority status within five years. The 
political policy clock (Noble and Smith 2000) was ticking and elected 
SBOE members were determined to see improvement. 
When the SBOE president moved to a discussion of the consulting 
contracts for the priority schools, Commissioner Blomstedt clearly 
stated the intention to develop a standardized response to priority 
schools when he told the board that he wanted consistency across how 
each progress plan was implemented and development of:  
a specialized type of approach to how we think about turn-
around in schools, how we do that work, and so, right now, 
we’re trying to use [the consultant’s] work to help us actually 
in the long run build capacity to do that work…[She] brings 
a special level of expertise to get that work accomplished. 
(Nebraska State Board of Education 2016b) 
Board member Flint posed the first question regarding the con-
tracts. “I was just wondering, it is quite a chunk of money, it’s like 
$256,000. Is she bidding hours? Does she have a bio or what other 
schools she’s helped out or something?” (Nebraska State Board of Ed-
ucation 2016b). Frison explained that the consultant had provided a 
schedule for the days she would work at each school. “At a minimum, 
three days a month she [or her associate] would be there [in each 
school] just coaching the staff in classrooms” (Nebraska State Board 
of Education 2016b). Board member Lillie Larson inquired about the 
length of the contract and Frison responded that the contract was for 
the 2016–2017 school year. 
With no further questions regarding the priority school implemen-
tation contract, the SBOE President moved on to the next discussion 
items on the board agenda. These included documents related to the 
priority school implementation beyond each school’s progress plan. 
There were two additional contract rationales for the lady from North 
Carolina’s consulting practice (and a third contract rationale with a 
Phill ips  &  Hamann  in  Anthrop olo gy  &  Educat ion  Quarterly ,  2021        20
regional educational service unit for the instructional coach at Santee 
Middle School). With the approval of these additional contracts the to-
tal amount contracted for the lady from North Carolina was $300,000 
between March 2016 and the end of the 2016–2017 school year (i.e., 
sixteen months). 
Although in all this contracting there was one awarded to a public 
Nebraska entity (i.e., the regional ESU), during the meeting no one 
asked whether the SDE could/should be doing this work instead. Three 
hundred thousand dollars over sixteen months could have supported 
three FTEs (full time equivalent) of well-trained SDE professionals, 
buying more than three days a month of time, permitting easier shar-
ing with less-involved SDE staff, improving the likelihood of contin-
ued interaction with involved schools and school districts when the 
contract was over, and having any lessons learned added to the SDE’s 
overall capacity. 
The consulting contract to support the first year’s progress plan im-
plementation in the three priority schools (for the 2016–2017 school 
year) was ultimately approved. Despite the SBOE’s significant invest-
ment, there was no formal inquiry into her model, nor any planned ex-
ternal evaluation of the first-year’s implementation at each school. Just 
after the end of this study period, in August 2017, it was announced 
that Druid Hills Elementary had “improved” and was being taken off 
the list (with a small-town high school that served a majority Latinx 
enrollment replacing it on the list). 
Following the conclusion of the study, the lady from North Caro-
lina’s contract was renewed in 2017–18 and again in 2018–19, push-
ing the state investment in her company near the million-dollar mark 
(Dejka 2019). No doubt her multi-year involvement in the state made 
her wiser and wiser about how Nebraska works, but it is worth nam-
ing the obvious: that expertise and familiarity was only available to 
the state if the consulting contracts continued to be renewed. While 
her reports would be delivered to the SDE (and through them to the 
SBOE), there was no described mechanism for how those reports were 
to be operationalized to change processes at other schools or SDE in-
teraction with them. There was certainly not discussion about the 
ways to customize her levers of instruction to the unique contexts of 
different priority schools.  
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Toward a Learning System? 
One could quibble with the strategies and tactics she employed in de-
veloping progress plans (or in the later implementation of those plans) 
or with the contract amounts she received. But ultimately, the purpose 
of this study is not to critique the external consultant’s efforts specif-
ically but rather to question the broader roles external consultants or 
the “consultocracy” are playing in policy implementation efforts to im-
prove schools according to standardized strategies and metrics of suc-
cess and, from that, to question what capacity-development opportu-
nities SDEs are squandering. As others like Ball (2009) or Mills (2015) 
have pointed out, the rhetoric around bringing in outside expertise 
to implement “best practices” can be alluring, however; it is worth 
examining the danger in standardizing and privatizing efforts to im-
prove schools. Renting expertise (as a less-costly alternative to hiring 
an individual and paying a pension) demonstrates a short-term way 
of thinking about capacity. This stands in contrast to the rhetoric be-
hind AQuESTT, which promised permanent capacity building. It raises 
the question: How can a state build permanent capacity with tempo-
rary investments? The goal of building long-term solutions through 
contracts with the lady from North Carolina (at the time of this study) 
was not met. The narrative here is not unique to Nebraska, which 
makes it worth pausing to question whether reliance on the “consul-
tocracy” is wise and to interrogate what is lost when external knowl-
edge has the most worth. 
The school accountability legislation passed by the Nebraska Legis-
lature in 2014 authorized the SDE, at the direction of the SBOE, to de-
velop processes to classify schools, designate priority schools, and de-
velop interventions for each. Throughout this implementation, there 
were decision points where the unique needs of local schools enduring 
mandated school improvement could have been prioritized according 
to the initial stated intention to attend to local context (Nebraska State 
Board of Education 2015). But the hiring of the lady from North Car-
olina reduced the role of SDE staff to support for a consultant (with 
an occasional second role managing incredulous comments from lo-
cal sites) while sidestepping any consideration of how the consultant’s 
finding might build NDE capacity to work with struggling schools. 
The mooted “template” or “scale up” prospects (however skeptical 
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the research literature is of such prospects) seemed to matter more 
as rhetoric than actual plan. 
The assumptions undergirding intervention work and the struc-
tures and processes developed to carry out intervention work reflect 
some of the reform clock collisions Noble and Smith (2000) described 
in their study of SDE-driven reforms in Delaware and Arizona. Inter-
vention work in the three priority schools was determined by the po-
litical clock, which “runs fast,” and “rarely provides sustained support 
for any initiative” (Noble and Smith 2000: 182). A real tension grew 
in the initial progress plan development and later plan implementa-
tion as the tempo of the political clock (which the SBOE and commis-
sioner needed to abide by) collided with the “teacher clock” (which 
included site-based school leaders in this case), which “runs slowly” 
(Noble and Smith 2000, 185). 
The contrasting tempos of the reform clocks in Nebraska’s case il-
luminate the political power constructs at play. The lady from North 
Carolina answered ultimately to her funders (the SBOE) rather than 
to those who were the “objects of the political technology at work” 
(Foucault 1977, 200)—the practitioners and students in the schools. 
Thus, an element of her role was to maintain the tempo of the polit-
ical clock in pursuing an improvement process in each school rather 
than to respond to the perspectives of local educators for whom suc-
cessful change efforts require time to “allow for teachers’ sense of 
agency to grow [as] pivotal to movement toward authentic change” 
(Noble and Smith, 2000, 185).  
There was a similar paradox here to one Koyama (2011) uncov-
ered when studying supplemental education service providers work-
ing in public schools per guidelines from NCLB. Koyama found these 
external providers were not held to the same level of accountability 
for their performance as the schools in which they worked. Similarly, 
there was no objective accountability for the lady from North Caroli-
na’s work in the priority schools. As long as she kept her employers 
happy (allowing them to appear to be working on helping a variety of 
struggling schools), she stayed in favor. 
When Commissioner Blomstedt asserted that Druid Hill—the school 
where the lady from North Carolina had consulted prior to the cre-
ation of AQuESTT—had made enough progress in one year to remove it 
from priority status and discontinue state intervention (Dejka 2017, 1), 
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the SBOE agreed. They did so despite not having an exit process in 
place and with the question about “tangible exit criteria” raised by 
board member McPherson in August 2016 still unanswered. With 
Druid Hill’s release, a new school, Schuyler Central High School, was 
designated as a priority school in August 2018, “despite angry appeals 
by the district to reconsider the designation” (Reist 2018, 3). Contracts 
with the lady from North Carolina continued, as did her prescription 
for “turning around” yet another school context. 
In January 2019, the state’s largest newspaper, the Omaha World 
Herald, noted that $965,000 dollars had been paid out to the lady from 
North Carolina’s consulting firm and asserted that she “perhaps more 
than any other person, outside of government officials, has put her 
fingerprints on school improvement in Nebraska” (Dejka 2019, 2-3). 
Their article did not say this occurred even though alternatives could 
easily have been imagined that would have leveraged existing or de-
veloped state capacity to construct long-term, sustainable solutions. 
For example, there could have been multiple consultants with exper-
tise variously related to urban, rural, and American Indian education 
who could have worked alongside priority schools while also training 
SDE employees. This would have attended to the reality that the pri-
ority schools were pretty different from each other and would have 
cultivated expertise at the SDE level. 
Priority school intervention and the reliance on an external consul-
tant in Nebraska highlights questions about policy prescriptions that 
privilege the needs of higher policy tiers (i.e., the SDE or SBOE), that 
ignore local context and knowledge, that rely on the work of external 
consultants who answer to funders (in this case the SBOE and SDE), 
and that are not designed to develop sustainable changes relevant be-
yond the borders of the state. 
The “consultocracy” is flawed when addressing state needs from 
a design perspective. Yet AQuESTT implementation did not have to 
proceed this way. The SBOE, the commissioner, and others could have 
asked what the state needed to do to develop an enduring capacity to 
help Nebraska’s different types of challenged public schools. Not only 
did that not occur, it seems that no one noticed that it could occur. 
The premise of turning to a consultant raised a few questions about 
whether she and her company were too expensive (worries she seems 
to have known how to successfully placate), but none about whether 
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turning to any consultant as the primary service provider intrinsically 
constrained capacity- building goals. Questions like these are signif-
icant for states designing systems to intervene in local schools as a 
part of ESSA implementation as well as for policymakers in a neolib-
eral era of education reform. 
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